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LOCKE V. DAVEYAND THE "PLAY IN THE JOINTS"
BETWEEN THE RELIGION CLAUSES
In Locke v. Davey,1 the United States Supreme Court affirmed that
"there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause
but not required by the Free Exercise Clause."' The Court held that
there is room for "play in the joint" '5 between the First Amendment's
two Religion Clauses,4 within which the State of Washington may
choose to fund a scholarship for all eligible students except those
students who choose to pursue a major in devotional theology. Both
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 5 andJustice Scalia in
dissent,6 agreed that the Establishment Clause would allow Washing-
ton to provide scholarships to students who major in theology, but
the two Justices differed on the question of whether, under the Free
124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
2 Id. at 1311.
3 Id. ("[W]e have long said that 'there is room for play in the joints' between [the Estab-
lishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause]."). Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted language
from Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970), in which the Court stated:
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by
the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or
governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed govern-
mental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which
will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.
Id. (emphasis added).
4 The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment provide that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. ." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
5 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1311-12 ("[T] here is no doubt that the State could, consistent with the
Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional theology .... "
(citing Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986))). Chief Justice
Rehnquist authored the majority opinion on behalf of seven members of the Court. Justice
Scalia dissented, joined by Justice Thomas, id. at 1315-20, and Justice Thomas filed a separate
dissent, id. at 1320-21.
6 Id. at 1317 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The establishment question would not even be close, as is
evident from the fact that this Court's decision in [Witters] was unanimous." (citation omitted)).
Justice Thomas previously stated in Mitchell v. Helms that the Establishment Clause does not for-
bid a state from funding religious schools and "other doctrines" may bar a state's refusal to fund
religious education. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("In short,
nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools
from otherwise permissible aid programs, and other doctrines of this Court bar it."). Mitchell v.
Helms was a plurality decision that upheld, on Establishment Clause grounds, the use of federal
funds channeled through Louisiana educational authorities, even though 30% of them were
allocated to private, often religious schools.
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Exercise Clause, Washington may choose to fund religious scholar-
ships, or whether it must do so.
Washington awards a "Promise Scholarship,"'  administered
through its Higher Education Coordinating Board ("HECB"), to se-
lect students attending post-secondary schools. Eligibility is based on
academics, family income, and enrollment requirements." An eligible
student may attend any accredited school in the state, whether it be
public or private, non-secular or religious; may use the Promise
Scholarship to subsidize up to two years of post-secondary education;
and may "spend the funds on any education-related expense, includ-
ing room and board."9 The only caveat is that qualifying students
may not use the Scholarship to pursue a degree in theology. °
7 Washington initiated the Promise Scholarship in 1999 "to facilitate college attendance by
low to middle income students from Washington who ranked among the top 10% of their high
school class." Davey v. Locke, No. COO-61R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 5, 2000). The value of the Scholarship varies from year to year depending on the level of
funding and the number of qualifying applicants. Id. For the 1999-2000 academic year, the
Scholarship was worth $1,125, id., and increased to $1,542 for 2000-2001, Davey v. Locke, 299
F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 2002).
8 When Davey filed his case in the district court, the pertinent provision of the Washington
law defined "Eligible student" as a person who:
(a) Graduates from a public or private high school located in the state of Washington;
and
(b) Is in the top ten percent of his or her 1999 graduating class; or
(c) Is in the top fifteen percent of his or her 2000 graduating class; and
(d) Has a family income less than one hundred thirty-five percent of the state's median;
and
(e) Enrolls at least half time in an eligible postsecondary institution in the state of Wash-
ington; and
(f) Is not pursuing a degree in theology.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12) (2000); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.10.814 (2002)
("No state aid shall be awarded to any student who is pursuing a degree in theology."). The
state law has since been altered to require a minimum score on the ACT or SAT, but the restric-
tion on excluding otherwise eligible students who major in theology remains. See WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 250-80-020(12) (g) (2004).
9 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1310.
10 HECB's policy provides that "no state aid shall be awarded to any student pursuing a de-
gree in theology." Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *5 n.1; WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.10.814
(2002); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-20(12) (f) (2000). The student's school of choice must
determine whether the student is eligible for the scholarship-i,e., is not pursuing a degree in
theology. The school must also confirm that the student enrolls at least half-time. WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12) (e) (2000). HECB determines whether an applicant is eligible
according to income and the student's high school academic record. If the student is initially
eligible, HECB submits the funds directly to the recipient's school of choice. WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 250-80-020(12) (a)-(d) (2000).
Washington Governor Gary Locke's current Web page offers a brief general description of
the Promise Scholarship, including the program's history since its inception in 1999, and pro-
vides the number of scholarship recipients since 1999 and estimates for the number of recipi-
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Joshua Davey was preliminarily awarded a Promise Scholarship in
the fall of 1999. He chose to attend Northwest College, a private
Christian school affiliated with the Assemblies of God. Upon en-
rollment, l2 Davey declared a double major in Business Manage-
ment/Administration and Pastoral Ministry. 3  Administrators at
Northwest then informed Davey that he was ineligible for the scholar-
ship due to his declared major in Pastoral Ministry,14 which Northwest
determined qualifies as "theology." While Washington's statutes,
rules, and regulations do not define the term "degree in theology,"
both parties conceded that "the statute simply codifies the State's
constitutional prohibition on providing funds to students to pursue
degrees that are 'devotional in nature or designed to induce religious
faith.'"'15
Davey filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District Court for
the Western District of Washington seeking to enjoin various officials
of the State of Washington from denying him the scholarship.16 The
ents for 2003 and 2004. It does not mention, however, that the scholarship is not available to
eligible students who choose to pursue a degree in theology. See Governor Gary Locke, State of
Washington, Promise Scholarships, http://www.governor.wa.gov/educate/promise.htm (last
visited May 12, 2004).
11 Northwest College is an eligible school under the Promise Scholarship Program. Davey,
124 S. Ct. at 1310.
12 It is customary for students at Northwest College to declare a major upon enrollment.
Brief for Respondent at 5, Davey (No. 02-1315).
13 Id. at 5.
14 Davey's brief emphasized that "Washington disqualifies from the Promise Scholarship
those who declare a major in theology." Id. at 6-7. Two students may take "the very same course-
load," but only the student who declares a major in theology is disqualified. Id.
15 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1310 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 6; Brief for Respondent at 8).
Throughout the Court's majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist consistently employs the
term "devotional theology," see id. at 1309-13, 1315, a term that was not used by either the Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Washington, which upheld the Scholarship, or the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which struck down the Scholarship as a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause. Presumably, the ChiefJustice intended his syntax to limit the majority's hold-
ing to denials of the scholarship for students studying "theology" taught from a religious per-
spective, and not for students pursuing a more general major in religious studies. In dissent,
Justice Thomas noted that "the study of theology does not necessarily implicate religious devo-
tion or faith." Id. at 1320 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. ("Because the parties agree that a
'degree in theology' means a degree that is 'devotional in nature or designed to induce reli-
gious faith,' I assume that this is so for purposes of deciding this case." (quoting Brief for Peti-
tioners at 6; Brief for Respondent at 8)). Davey's brief to the Supreme Court never employed
the exact term "devotional theology," preferring instead the phrase "major in theology taught
from a religious perspective," Brief for Respondent at i, which was the terminology employed by
the Ninth Circuit, see, e.g., Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 760 (9th Cir. 2002).
16 Davey v. Locke, No. C00-61R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2000).
Davey also brought claims under the Establishment, Free Exercise, and Free Speech Clauses of
the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment; the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and article I, §§ 11 and 5 of the Washington Constitu-
tion. Article I, § 11, the "Religious Freedom" provision of Washington's constitution, provides
that:
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district court rejected all of Davey's claims and granted summary
judgment in favor of Washington. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed. 8 The divided panel stated that "denying a
Promise Scholarship to a student otherwise qualified for it according
to objective criteria solely because the student decides to pursue a
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and
worship shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or dis-
turbed in person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby
secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state. No public money shall be appropriated for
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establish-
ment ....
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (emphasis added). At the district court level, Davey relied on the first
portion of this provision, which he argued guaranteed protection to "use Promise Scholarship
funds to pursue religious instruction as an expression of his beliefs." Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22273, at *6. Conversely, HECB argued that the last sentence of this article is a valid
prohibition on the use of state money to fund religious education. Id.
Article I, § 5 is the free speech clause of Washington's constitution, which provides that
"every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of that right." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5. The district court denied this claim outright not-
ing that neither HECB's policy nor the state statute at issue regulates speech. Davey, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *11 ("Davey can still speak freely-he just cannot demand that Washing-
ton pay for him to do so.").
17 Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273. The district court concluded that "[b]ecause the
Washington Constitution prohibits the funding of religious instruction, both by its express
terms and as interpreted by the state's highest court, HECB is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on Davey's Article I, § 11 claims." Id. at *9. The court relied on the Washington Su-
preme Court's decision in Witters v. State Comm'nfor the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 850 (1989) (mem.), which was taken on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court. See
Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). The U.S. Supreme Court
had held that providing state aid, as part of a rehabilitative program, to a student who was using
the funds to study to become a minister, did not violate the federal Establishment Clause. On
remand, however, the state supreme court held that "the state establishment clause was more
restrictive on government funding than the federal provision." Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22273, at *9. The state court found that, although the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution permitted Washington to fund certain religious aid, the state establishment clause pre-
cluded such funding. Thus, the state could permissibly decline to provide aid to Mr. Witters.
The district court rejected Davey's other claim under Washington's constitution. See Davey,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *11-12 (rejecting claims under the "free speech" clause of
Washington's constitution, WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5). The court also rejected all of Davey's
claims under the U.S. Constitution. See id. at *12-17 (rejecting claims under the Free Exercise
Clause); id. at *17-18 (rejecting claims under the Establishment Clause); id. at *18-23 (reject-
ing claims under the Free Speech and Free Association Clauses); id. at *24-25 (rejecting claims
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at *25-26 (rejecting
"vagueness" claims under the Fourteenth Amendment).
is Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit held that the policy em-
ployed by HECB facially discriminated against religion; since it lacked neutrality on its face, the
policy must survive strict scrutiny. Id. at 750. Because the court found that Washington did not
have a compelling state interest in not violating its own constitution, which prohibits the state
from providing tax dollars to fund religious education, it held that denying Davey the scholar-
ship was unconstitutional. Id.
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degree in theology from a religious perspective infringes his right to
the free exercise of his religion." 9
II
The United State Supreme Court granted certiorari and in a
seven-to-two opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, reversed
the Ninth Circuit." The Court addressed the question "whether
Washington, pursuant to its own constitution, which has been au-
thoritatively interpreted as prohibiting even indirectly funding reli-
gious instruction that will prepare students for the ministry, can deny
them such funding without violating the Free Exercise Clause. 2 2 A
strong majority of the Court answered that question in the affirma-
tive. It concluded that even though, under the Court's Establishment
Clause precedent, Washington could choose to provide Davey a
Promise Scholarship to fund his degree in Pastoral Ministry, the Free
Exercise Clause does not require Washington to make that "choice.
23
This follows upon Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the• 24
Blind, in which the Court unanimously held that Washington would
not violate the Establishment Clause by providing public funds for
rehabilitative education to a student studying to be a minister. 5
19 Id. at 760. The Ninth Circuit held that the Promise Scholarship violated the Free Exercise
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 750. Although the court discussed Davey's other consti-
tutional claims, it declined to reach them once it found a free exercise violation. Id. at 760.
20 Locke v. Davey, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003) (mem.).
21 Even though Davey asserted claims under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chief Justice Rehnquist
summarily rejected Davey's claims under those two clauses in one footnote. Locke v. Davey, 124
S. Ct. 1307, 1312 n.3 (2004). He stated that "the Promise Scholarship Program is not a forum
for speech," thus vitiating Davey's free speech claim, and that the program passes the deferen-
tial "rational-basis" review under the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
22 Id. at 1312 (citations omitted).
23 Id. at 1311-12.
24 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
25 In a way, Davey serves as a "companion case" to Witters since, in Davey, Davey essentially
argued the flip-side of the Witters coin. Once the Supreme Court definitively declared that
Washington was constitutionally permitted to fund religious education, if the funding was a part
of a general funding scheme and not intended to favor religion qua religion, it was only a mat-
ter of time before someone like Davey alleged that if Washington provided such aid for secular
programs, it was required to provide aid to religious progams as well. Witters was decided in
the middle of a line of cases that upheld state funding of religious education when public funds
flow through a student or parent, before they reach the school. The student's "independent
and private choice" to apply scholarship funds toward religious education (since the student is
not bound to attend parochial school) breaks the link between church and state for Establish-
ment Clause purposes. Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1311; see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639
(2002) (upholding, under the Establishment Clause, a pilot program in Ohio that provided aid
to private schools, including religious schools); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S.
1 (1993) (holding that the Establishment Clause permits a publicly employed sign-language
interpreter to accompany a deaf student to classes at a Catholic high school, pursuant to the
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The Court reviewed the Free Exercise Clause precedent on which
Davey relied and concluded that the Promise Scholarship involved
different factual circumstances and "far milder" state disfavor of relig-
ion than the Court had invalidated in prior cases. 6 For instance, the
Washington program did not involve imposing "criminal [or] civil
sanctions on any type of religious service or rite";27 did not prohibit
ministers from participating in "the political affairs of the commu-
nity";28 and did not require Davey to make a forced "choice" between
adhering to a religious belief and receiving a government benefit.2
The Court noted a strong opposition to funding religious instruc-
tion throughout the history of the United States ° that supported
Washington's choice to fund one form of "training" while choosing
not to fund another, since "training for religious professions and
training for secular professions are not fungible."sl Like the United
States Constitution, Washington's constitution draws a line between
Individuals with Disabilities Act); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding, under the
Establishment Clause, a Minnesota law that allowed parents to deduct expenses from their chil-
dren's elementary and secondary school tuition and costs, even though the deduction primarily
benefited parents whose children attended religious schools).
26 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312.
Id. (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(striking down as unconstitutional city ordinances that criminalized certain types of animal
slaughter, which were specifically geared towards suppression of the free exercise of the Sante-
ria religion)).
20 Id. (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (striking down a Tennessee statute that
forbade ministers from being elected to serve as a delegate at the state constitutional conven-
tion as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause)).
29 Id. at 1312-13 (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987)
(holding that the denial of unemployment compensation benefits based on an individual's re-
fusal to work certain times because of her religious beliefs was a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding, under the Free Exercise Clause,
that Indiana could not deny unemployment compensation benefits to an individual who termi-
nated his job because his religious beliefs forbade him to produce armaments); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the denial of unemployment compensation benefits
based on an individual's refusal to work on Saturdays because of her religious beliefs was a vio-
lation of the Free Exercise Clause)).
30 The Court noted that historically, "[s]ince the founding of our country," citizens have op-
posed using tax dollars to fund religious education. Id. at 1313-14; see also id. at 1313 n.6 (citing
JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785)).
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance was written in opposition to a "Bill establishing a provision
for Teachers of the Christian Religion," that was proposed in Virginia. MADISON, supra, reprinted
in STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE 4 (2001). He stated that providing public funds to
support religious teaching would be a "dangerous abuse of power." Id.; see also Marci Hamilton,
The Supreme Court Issues a Monumental Decision: Equal State Scholarship Access for Theology Students Is
Not Required by the Free Exercise Clause, FINDLAW (Feb. 27, 2004), at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20040227.html ("James Madison's important Memorial
and Remonstrance rested on [the very principle of prohibiting the payment of government funds
for ministerial education]. And in its opinion in [Davey], the Court points out that most states
have-and have had, from the beginning-similar prohibitions to Washington's in their consti-
tutions.").
31 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1313.
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secular education and religious pursuits, which the Court character-
ized as "of a different ilk. 3 2  With both American history and the
plain text of the state constitution on its side, Washington is entitled
to choose not to fund training for those who wish to pursue a reli-
gious calling."
The Court rejected Dave 's reliance upon Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, refusing to "extend the Lukumi line of
cases well beyond not only their facts but their reasoning."35  The
Court distinguished the Washington program on the grounds that, in
Lukumi, the state action at issue had an "impermissible object": it
evinced clear hostility toward the Santeria religion." In contrast, the
Court did not consider the Promise Scholarship hostile towards relig-
ion.37 Rather, the scholarship "goes a long way toward including re-
ligion in its benefits.Os3 The only limitation is that students may not
both major in devotional theology and receive a Promise Scholarship.
The Court refused to follow Lukumi absent a finding that the Wash-
ington statute or the HECB policy showed animus toward religion. 9
Since Lukumi was inapposite, the Promise Scholarship Program did
not warrant the application of strict scrutiny and was not presump-
tively unconstitutional. 4° Thus, the Court rejected Davey's claims
since Washington's "interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional
degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a rela-
tively minor burden on Promise Scholars."4' The Court concluded
that the Promise Scholarship, as it currently operated, did not violate
the Free Exercise Clause. Even though, under the Establishment
Clause, Washington could permissibly allow students to apply
32 Id. at 1314.
33 See id. at 1313 ("The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruc-
tion.").
34 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
35 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312.
36 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 524.
" Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1314-15; see id. at 1314-15 n.8 (citing examples of Washington's "so-
licitous" attempt to "[ensure] that its constitution is not hostile towards religion").
38 Id. at 1314. First and foremost, students may attend "pervasively religious schools," id. at
1315, they may enroll in devotional theology courses, id., and "may have additional religious
requirements as part of their majors," id.
39 See id. ("In short, we find neither in the history or text of Article I, § 11 of the Washington
Constitution, nor in the operation of the Promise Scholarship Program, anything that suggests
animus towards religion.").
40 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion never specified which type of scrutiny the majority ap-
plied; it simply stated that since no presumption of unconstitutionality existed, Davey's claim
must fail. See id. The Court seemed to engage in some sort of balancing approach in weighing
the competing interests at stake since it considered the state's interest in not funding religious
education "substantial" and Davey's burden in not receiving the scholarship "relatively minor."
Id.; we also id. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting parenthetically that the majority opinion is
"devoid of any mention of standard of review").
Id. at 1315 (majority opinion).
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Promise Scholarships towards degrees in theology, the Free Exercise
Clause does not force Washington to make that "choice." "If any
room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here."42
III
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,43' dissented, contending
that the Court's decisions in Lukum" and McDaniel v. Paty 5 required
the Court to apply strict scrutiny to Washington's program.46 Justice
Scalia disagreed with the majority's interpretation of precedent and
history, which it used to demonstrate that state funding of clergy had
historically been disfavored.4 ' He relied heavily on the principle of
"neutrality" and asserted that the majority's decision, which sustains
"a public benefit program that facially discriminates against
42 Id.
43 Justice Thomas also filed a separate dissent. See id. at 1320-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see
also infra Part IV (analyzing Thomas's dissenting opinion).
44 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding
that a law that is neither neutral towards religion nor generally applicable must survive strict
scrutiny).
45 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (holding that a state may not, consistent with the Free Exercise
Clause, preclude ministers from being eligible for election to serve at the state's constitutional
convention). Justice Scalia noted that in McDaniel, the state had a bona fide interest in remain-
ing faithful to the separation of church and state, but that interest "did not justify facial dis-
crimination against religion." Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1320.
46 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1315-20.
4 Justice Scalia argued that the "history" upon which the majority opinion relied referred to
programs that singled out religious groups for aid. He thought that the majority mischaracter-
ized the historical "disfavor" of using tax dollars to fund clergy by not drawing a distinction be-
tween laws that favored clergy specifically and laws that included clergy in part of a scheme of
generally applicable benefits. Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1316-17 & n.1. He stated, "One can concede
the Framers' hostility to funding the clergy specifically, but that says nothing about whether the
clergy had to be excluded from benefits the State made available to all." Id. at 1316. Addition-
ally, Justice Scalia alleged that the majority's reliance on early state constitutions was equally
misplaced. Id. at 1317 n.1. He believes that these early constitutions only meant to preclude
laws that singled-out clergy for aid, not laws that excluded clergy from receiving generally avail-
able public benefits. Id. The majority's interpretation, he wrote, "has no logical stopping-point
short of the absurd." Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist on the other hand, uses that very point to
strengthen the majority's holding: "That early state constitutions saw no problem in explicitly
excluding only the ministry from receiving state dollars reinforces our conclusion that religious
instruction is of a different ilk." Id. at 1314 (majority opinion). The text of article I, § 11 of
Washington's constitution prohibits the use of public money for religious education without
distinguishing between laws that exclude clergy specifically and laws that exclude clergy as part of
a general scheme. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("No public money or property shall be appropri-
ated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any reli-
gious establishment.... ."). Justice Scalia was not impressed by the majority's reliance upon the
"plain text" of such state constitutions. Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1317 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Since the Court cannot identify any instance in which [state constitutional provisions that
prohibited the use of tax funds to support the ministry] were applied in such a discriminatory
fashion, its appeal to their 'plain text' adds nothing whatever to the 'plain text' of Washington's
own Constitution." (citation omitted)).
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religion, 4 is irreconcilable with the Court's decision in Lukumi.49 He
cited Everson v. Board of Education for the principle that "governs this
case":50 that a state may not exclude members of any religious group,
"because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of
public welfare legislation."5 '
Justice Scalia criticized the majority's use of the "principle, 52 of
"play in the joints.",s Injustice Scalia's view, "play in the joints" must
necessarily cede to neutrality: "If the Religion Clauses demand neu-
trality, we must enforce them, in hard cases as well as easy ones., 54 He
argued that Washington could revise its program in numerous ways
that would not discriminate on the basis of religion, but that 'Just
happen[] not to subsidize it."55 Justice Scalia assailed the state's as-
serted interests in not funding religious education as "pure philoso-
phical preference: the State's opinion that it would violate taxpayers'
freedom of conscience not to discriminate against candidates for the
48 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49 Lukumi held that a statute that was neither neutral nor generally applicable must survive
strict scrutiny. 508 U.S. at 546. "Neutrality" at minimum means that "a law not discriminate on
its face." Id. at 533.
50 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
16(1947)).
51 Id. (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16). Neither Justice Scalia nor Chief Justice Rehnquist
cited to Justice Black's famous statement in Everson, which, if followed, could also "govern this
case": "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion." Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. It may be that "this principle [is] now nothing more than a
historical artifact[.]" STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE 75 (Supp. 2003).
52 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1317 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) ("I use the term 'principle' loosely, for that
is not so much a legal principle as a refusal to apply any principle when faced with competing
constitutional directives.").
53 Id. at 1317. Justice Scalia states, "There is nothing anomalous about constitutional com-
mands that abut." Id. As an example, he provides: "A municipality hiring public contractors
may not discriminate against blacks or in favor of them; it cannot discriminate a little bit each
way and then plead 'play in the joints' when haled into court." Id. (implicitly referring to, but
not citing by name, City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 479 (1989), which invalidated
Richmond's city council's plan requiring contractors receiving city construction contracts to
subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of its contracts to Minority Business En-
terprises). ButJustice Scalia's example fails to explain constitutional commands that "abut." In
order for there to be "play in the joints" in the race discrimination context, it seems there
would have to be a "constitutional command" that conflicts with the Equal Protection Clause.
There is no "play in the joints" in Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence because there are no
joints: there isjust one Equal Protection Clause. "Play in the joints" exists precisely because the
Constitution includes two Religion Clauses: "the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause, [which] are frequently in tension." Id. at 1311 (majority opinion). Justice Scalia does
not supply any principle that could potentially be "in tension" with the Equal Protection Clause
in the example that he cites.
Id. at 1317 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
55 Id. Citing Washington's "usually sensitive concern for the conscience of its taxpayers,"
Justice Scalia offers the suggestion that Washington could make "scholarships redeemable only
at public universities" or "only for select courses of study," either of which, he maintains, would
comply with the Free Exercise Clause. Id.
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ministry. ", 6 He criticized the majority's attempt to justify the Wash-
ington policy by claiming that Davey's burden is minimal and that the
policy shows no animus toward religion. 57 He countered that Davey's
burden is substantial; essentially, denial of the scholarship is equal to
a $3,0005 financial penalty that Davey must pay to freely exercise his
religion.59 Secondly, he disagreed that a legislature's motives should
have any bearing on whether a law should be struck down as uncon-
stitutional, noting that the Court typically does not require a showing
of "substantial harm" before invalidating a discriminatory statute. 60
Scalia made his view clear towards the end of his opinion: "Let
there be no doubt: This case is about discrimination against a reli-
gious minority .... [T] hose whose belief in their religion is so strong
that they dedicate their study and their lives to its ministry ....
Washington offered a generally applicable benefit and "carved out a
solitary course of study for exclusion: theology., 6' Thus, the Wash-
ington policy denied Davey equal protection under the law.63 Justice
Scalia stated:
When the State makes a public benefit generally available, that benefit
becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on religion are
measured; and when the State withholds that benefit from some indi-
viduals solely on the basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise Clause
no less than if it had imposed a special tax.64
Davey was discriminated against solely because of his religious be-
liefs, which, according to Justice Scalia, violates the Free Exercise
Clause. Washington's policy does not discriminate against members
of a particular faith, or favor one religion over another; instead, it fa-
vors those who practice "only a tepid, civic version of faith."6 5 Justice
Scalia analogized Davey's plight to that of "other disfavored groups,"
56 Id. at 1318. Scalia suggests that this type of "preference" has "no logical limit" and fears
that it could be used to exclude religion "from public programs in virtually any context." Id.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, responded to Justice Scalia's concern stating,
"the only interest at issue here is the State's interest in not funding the religious training of
clergy. Nothing in our opinion suggests that the State may justify any interest that its 'philoso-
phical preference' commands." Id. at 1313 n.5 (majority opinion).
57 Id. at 1318-19 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
58 Davey sacrificed $2,667. See id. at 1310 (majority opinion) ("The scholarship was worth
$1,125 for academic year 1999-2000 and $1,542 for 2000-2001.").
59 Id. at 1319 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
60 Id. ("The Court has not required proof of 'substantial' concrete harm with other forms of
discrimination and it should not do so here." (citations omitted)).
61 Id. at 1320.
62 Id. at 1316.
63 Id.
6 Id.
Id. at 1320 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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including "blacks, 66 men ages eighteen to twenty, women,6 8 and
homosexuals.69 He implied that because the Court has "come to the
aid of' other minority groups in recent years, it should be sensitive to
religious "minorities" as well.7 0  The analysis he applied, with refer-
ence to several equal protection cases, resembled an "equal protec-
tion analysis" under the Free Exercise Clause.7'
IV
Justice Thomas filed a separate dissent" to express his concern
that the term "theology," which Washington does not define, is capa-
ble of a much broader interpretation than the majority narrowly
credits it. Generally, he wrote, "the study of theology does not neces-
sarily implicate religious devotion or faith."7 3  Rather, "theology"
could include study "from a secular perspective as well as from a reli-
gious one."74  Thus, Thomas wrote separately to convey his
understanding that the majority's opinion, although in his view
Id. at 1319 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down segregation
on the basis of race in public schools as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (reversing a summary judgment order and remanding to dis-
trict court the issue whether congressional district lines were racially gerrymandered, conclud-
ing that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the state's redistricting scheme
was racially motivated; Justice Scaliajoined the majority)).67 ...
Id. (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down a Oklahoma law that pro-
hibited sales of three and two-tenths percent beer to men under twenty-one years but only to
women under eighteen years of age, as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause)).
68 Id. at 1319 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that the Virginia
Military Institute's male-only admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause; Justice
Scalia dissented); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating a federal
statute that set fixed wage standards for women on equal protection grounds)).
69 Id. at 1320 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)); see infra note 70 (discussing Ro-
mer).
70 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1320 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In an era when the Court is so quick to
come to the aid of other disfavored groups, its indifference in this case, which involves a form of
discrimination to which the Constitution actually speaks, is exceptional."). Justice Scalia cited
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), a case in which the Court "came to the aid" of homosexuals
by invalidating an amendment to Colorado's constitution that forbade any state actor from
granting homosexuals "protected status." Justice Scalia "vigorously" dissented from the Court's
opinion and criticized the majority for placing "the prestige of this institution behind the
proposition that opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias."
Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He lambasted the majority for "imposing" the
"elite" view that "'animosity' towards homosexuality is evil." Id. (citation omitted).
71 Cf McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 643 (1978) (White,J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
plurality and concurring opinions that found the Tennessee statute at issue to violate the Free
Exercise Clause, but asserting that the law was unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
72 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1320-21 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
73 Id. at 1320.
74 Id. at 1321.
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erroneous, is limited "to students who pursue a degree in devotional
theology.
75
V
In holding that Washington may single out religion for discrimi-
natory treatment, the Court disrupted the seemingly clear split be-
tween a permissible neutral, generally applicable law that incidentally
burdens the free exercise of religion 6 and an impermissible law that
singles out religion on its face for discriminatory treatment.77 The
Court retreated from the broad language it used in Lukumi and
seemed to limit the application of strict scrutiny to instances when
state actions evince hostility towards religion. 7s The Court's holding
grants significant deference to states as to which forms of education
they choose to fund (or not to fund) and, for the time being, leaves
intact numerous state constitutions and statutes that explicitly forbid
expenditures of state funds to support religious education.
The Framers of the First Amendment sought to safeguard the
freedoms of Americans by protecting them against the threat posed
by state-sponsored establishment of religion (the Establishment
Clause) and, of equal importance, by securing each citizen's right to
freely practice one's chosen faith (the Free Exercise Clause). The
Framers "singled out" religion for protection in both contexts, in a
sense discriminating both against religion (Establishment Clause) and
in favor of religion (Free Exercise Clause) beginning with the very first
75 Id. (emphasis added).
76 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that a neutral, generally ap-
plicable criminal law that prohibited use of peyote, even for use in religious ceremonies, did
not violate the Free Exercise Clause); see also Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1318 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Smith and noting that the Court is no longer "in the business of reviewing facially neutral
laws that merely happen to burden some individual's religious exercise").
77 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that
such laws must survive strict scrutiny, which is nearly impossible); see also Richard F. Duncan,
Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the Generally Applicability Require-
ment, 3 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 850, 851 (2001) ("[T]he key to understanding the Constitution's pro-
tection of religious liberty in the post-Smith world is to locate the boundary line between neutral
laws of general applicability and those that fall short of this standard.").
78 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1314-15 (majority opinion).
79 See Michael W. McConnell, A Response to Professor Marshall, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 329, 331
(1991) ("Those who claim that religion may not be 'singled out' must grapple with the very text
of the First Amendment, which refers specifically to 'religion.' Why religion is distinguished
from other forms of belief is open to many interpretations, but that it was distinguished seems
undeniable."); see also Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1313 ("[T]he subject of religion is one in which both
the United States and state constitutions embody distinct views-in favor of free exercise, but
opposed to establishment-that find no counterpart with respect to other callings or profes-
sions.").
1170 [Vol. 6:5
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
words of the Bill of Rights. 8 As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, these
clauses are often in tension, ' and how they should be read in con-
junction has often been hotly disputed.82
To add to the tension, the Washington Constitution strictly pro-
hibits the use of state funds for religious education. In the larger po-
litical context of states' abilities to fund religion, Washington's consti-
tution resembles a version of a "Blaine Amendment,"8  which have
been criticized due to their anti-Catholic motivations. 4 Although
Chief Justice Rehnquist denied that the provision in Washington's
80 See McConnell, supra note 79, at 329 ("Both [free exercise and establishment principles]
'single out' religion for special treatment, but sometimes this is an advantage and sometimes a
disadvantage.").
81 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1311.
82 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("The Court has struggled to find a
neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and
either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."); Philip
B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1961). As Profes-
sor Kurland aptly stated:
The utilization or application of these clauses in conjunction is difficult. For if the
command is that inhibitions not be placed by the state on religious activity, it is equally
forbidden the state to confer favors upon religious activity. These commands would be
impossible of effectuation unless they are read together as creating a doctrine more akin
to the reading of the equal protection clause that to the due process clause, i.e., they
must be read to mean that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for pur-
poses of governmental action, whether that action be the conferring of rights or privi-
leges or the imposition of duties or obligations.
Id. Scalia's dissenting opinion resembles Professor Kurland's analysis. He describes Davey's
case as a matter of inequality and discrimination, seeDavey, 124 S. Ct. at 1316, 1318-20 (Scalia,
J., dissenting), and believes that any statute that facially discriminates on the basis of religion,
like the Washington law, must satisfy strict scrutiny. Id. at 1316.
83 The so-called "Blaine Amendment" was named after James G. Blaine, who was Speaker of
the United States House of Representatives from 1869-75. Blaine proposed several versions of
an amendment to the House, which, in various forms, strictly forbade state tax funds from be-
ing used for religious schools or property. See GEY, supra note 51, at 75. Following the intro-
duction of Blaine's bill in 1875, several states proposed "baby-Blaine" amendments to their state
constitutions, and currently, thirty-seven states have some form of constitutional. provision that
restricts state aid from flowing to religious education. Id. at 76. ChiefJustice Rehnquist denied
that the provision in Washington's constitution was in fact a Blaine Amendment. Davey, 124 S.
Ct. at 1314 n.7 ("Neither Davey nor amici have established a credible connection between the
Blaine Amendment and Article 1, § 11 ... ."). Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed that the Ena-
bling Act of 1889, Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4, which authorized the enactment of the
Washington Constitution, required the states to provide that public schools should be free from
sectarian control. Id.; see also GEY, supra note 51, at 76 (stating same). While the Enabling Act
required "free[dom] from sectarian control," however, it did not specifically require states to
forbid tax dollars from being spent on religion. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4. The framers
of Washington's original constitution went above and beyond the requirement imposed by the
Enabling Act by including a provision that specifically prohibits the use of state funds to support
religious education. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; supra note 16 (quoting WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 11).
84 See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 298 (paperback ed. 2004)
(characterizing the "Blaine Amendment" as an anti-Catholic measure to restrict state funding of
Catholic schools while allowing a "generalized Protestantism in public schools").
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constitution is a Blaine Amendment, 5 and neither Justices Scalia nor
Thomas brought up the subject of Blaine Amendments, it is impor-
tant to note that laws prohibiting the use of state funds for religious
education have a long history in the United States, and have been
heavily criticized every step of the way. Nevertheless, states have en-
joyed considerable deference in deciding how to appropriate state
funds for education.
The use of precedent by both the majority and Justice Scalia in at-
tempting to reconcile what the two Clauses command was "nothing
short of bizarre," 6 and borders on the disingenuous. Chief Justice
Rehnquist relied on the factual distinctions between this case and the
Court's prior free exercise cases to distinguish this case but did not
effectively use precedent to support the majority's holding. Justice
Scalia, on the other hand, cited general propositions included in past
decisions but gleaned over glaring factual differences. The Chief Jus-
tice distinguished several other free exercise cases in an attempt to
define what this case is not it is not a city ordinance geared toward
suppressing the rituals of one particular religion (citing Lukumi) ;87 it
is not a matter of precluding ministers from participating in state
politics (citing McDaniel v. Paty) ;88 and it does not require a choice be-
tween exercising one's religious belief or receiving a public benefit
(citing the "unemployment compensation" line of cases).s9 Yet, he
failed to cite one case that directly supports the majority's opinion
that a state may deny a scholarship to a recipient solely on the basis of
religion, or that a statute may, on its face, discriminate against relig-
ion. The majority's opinion circumvented the clear language of
85 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1314 n.7; see also supra note 83 (discussing the Blaine Amendment and
ChiefJustice Rehnquist's dismissive arguments).
86 To borrow a phrase used by Justice Scalia. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216,
252 n.7 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The notion that the government can keep the property without
compensation, and relegate the owner to his remedies against the private party, is nothing short
of bizarre." (emphasis added)).
Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993)); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing Lukumi).
8 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312 (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)); see also supra note
28 and accompanying text (discussing McDaniel).
89 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312 (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136
(1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963));
see also supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the unemployment compensation
cases). Justice Scalia disputed this final contention. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1319 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). He argued that Davey was forced to choose between exercising his religion and re-
ceiving state funds. However, Justice Scalia did not cite the "unemployment compensation"
cases for support.
90 As noted above, see supra note 3 and accompanying text, Chief Justice Rehnquist did cite
to Walz to support his application of the principle that there exists room for "play in the joints"
between the two Religion Clauses. Walz was decided under the Establishment Clause; it held
that New York could permissibly grant tax exemptions to religious organizations for properties
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Lukumi, which stated that if a law is not neutral or generally applica-
ble, then it is presumptively unconstitutional and must survive strict
scrutiny.9 The majority declined to apply strict scrutiny,92 however,
and instead, effectively limited application of the "neutrality" princi-
ple employed by the Court in Lukumi, to cases where there is evi-
dence of animus towards religion, or when a statute was enacted to
burden religion. When the state's "disfavor of religion (if it can be
called that) is of a far milder kind, 9 3 strict scrutiny is not warranted.
In dissent, Justice Scalia relies heavily on Lukumi and McDaniel for
the general propositions that a law that uses religion as a classifica-
tion must satisfy strict scrutiny.94 ButJustice Scalia did not discuss the
stark factual differences between Lukumi, McDaniel, and the case at
hand. For instance, in Lukumi, there was considerable evidence indi-
cating that the City of Hialeah enacted the ordinances in question
specifically to suppress religiously-motivated rituals involved in the
practices of Santeria.95 In contrast, at issue in Locke v. Davey, was a
provision in Washington's original constitution that reflected the po-
litical decisions of its framers9 and the HECB policy that was enacted
used solely for religious worship. As precedent, Walz is inapposite to the Court's holding in
Dave.
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546 ("A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of
general application must undergo the most rigorous scrutiny."); see also Davey, 124 S. Ct. at
1315-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting same); Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir.
2002) (relying on Lukumi in striking down the Promise Scholarship on Free Exercise grounds
and quoting it for the proposition that a non-neutral law that burdens religion undergoes the
"most rigorous of scrutiny" (quoting Lukumi 508 U.S. at 546)).
91 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the Consti-
tution, 1II HARv. L. REv. 54, 93 (1997) ("A strong majority of the Supreme Court had held that
legislation enacted for the purpose of burdening or discouraging religious practice violates the
Free Exercise Clause." (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532-33)).
92 As Justice Scalia noted, the majority opinion did not state which standard of review it ap-
plied. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 1312 (majority opinion).
94 Id. at 1315-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Lukumi); id. at 1319-20 (discussing
McDaniel).
95 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542.
96 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11. In previous Religion Clause cases, Justice Scalia has been very
sensitive to the history of certain practices. For example, in his dissent in Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577 (1992), Justice Scalia condemned the majority's holding that a prayer delivered at a
high school graduation ceremony at a public school was a violation of the Establishment Clause;
he criticized the majority opinion as "conspicuously bereft of any reference to history." Id. at
631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He believed that the Establishment Clause should not be used to
strike down such a long-standing practice of prayer at graduation and other public ceremonies.
Id. at 631-32 ("Today's opinion shows more forcefully than volumes of argumentation why our
Nation's protection, that fortress which is our Constitution ... must have deep foundations in
the historic practices of our people."). In the gender-discrimination context, he has also shown
deep sympathy for "tradition." See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[The majority's opinion] counts for nothing the long tradition, endur-
ing down to the present, of men's military colleges supported by both States and the Federal
Government."). In his dissent in Davey, however, he characterized the views of the framers of
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to comply with the state constitution. 9' Washington evinced no ap-
parent animus toward religion; it just desired to maintain fiscal sepa-
ration between chuch and state.
McDaniel v. Paty was a narrow holding in which the plurality held
that Tennessee could not forbid ministers from running for public
office.9 The crux of the plurality opinion was that Tennessee could
not force McDaniel to forgo one right (freely exercising his religious
belief) so that he could exercise a different right (running for elected
office).
Although no precedent directly supports the majority's decision
not to apply strict scrutiny to a non-neutral law, that decision is sensi-
ble in light of the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
Washington's decision not to fund ministerial training--Washington
evinced no animus toward religion but rather only intended to avoid
a conflict with the establishment clause in its own constitution. The
majority's holding is logically consistent with the Court's decisions in
Lukumi and Employment Division v. Smith.99 At its core, Lukumi is a nar-
row holding: apply strict scrutiny only when a state specifically seeks
to suppress the free exercise of religion. Essentially, Smith followed a
similar line of reasoning. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, de-
clined to apply strict scrutiny to a neutral, generally applicable law
that criminalized the possession of peyote and did not provide an ex-
ception for peyote use in religious rituals.'° Justice Scalia refused to
find that the right to the free exercise of religion outweighed the
state's interest in enforcing its criminal laws.
Like in Davey, the decision was left up to the states: Each state can
decide whether to carve out an exception from its criminal laws to
Washington's constitution as "pure philosophical preference," 124 S. Ct. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting), and the state's "usually sensitive concern" for its taxpayers, id. at 1317, despite the fact
that these "preferences" and "concerns" have rested firmly in place since the drafting of Wash-
ington's constitution. Many state constitutions, including most state constitutions that were en-
acted around the time of the founding of this nation, included a provision that formally for-
bade use of tax funds to support the ministry. See id. at 1314 (majority opinion) (citing eight
states' constitutions, enacted from 1776 to 1802, the plain text of which "prohibited any tax dol-
lars from supporting the clergy").
97 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12) (2000) (restricting an eligible student to one who
"[i]s not pursuing a degree in theology"). The Ninth Circuit noted this difference in its opin-
ion, but nevertheless held that the statute "implicates the free exercise interests implicated in
Lukumi," since the statute referred to religion on its face. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 753
(9th Cir. 2002).
98 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
100 Id. at 879 (citing cases for the proposition that "the right of free exercise does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes)'" (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in judgment))).
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exempt religious practices; and each state can decide whether to
fund religious training. Part of the decisions in both Smith and Davey
were arguably influenced by "free exercise phobia."' °' Justice Scalia
narrowly decided Smith to prevent everyone under the sun from
claiming a religious exemption from having to obey criminal laws.1
0 2
In the same respect, one can argue that Chief Justice Rehnquist nar-
rowly decided Davey to prevent states from having to fund every con-
ceivable form of religious education simply because they choose to
support higher education in general. If one focused not on the law
or policy at issue but instead at the effect on free exercise of religion,
the decision in Smith is far more restrictive than Davey--if a state may
criminalize and effectively forbid the "free exercise" of religion, albeit
incidentally, by criminalizing peyote use, then a state should be able
to make a funding choice, albeit intentionally, that excludes some
categories while including others.
Chief Justice Rehnquist made a valid point in noting the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence that upheld the "private and in-
dividual choice" theory,0 3 which is the proposition that the "link be-
tween government funds and religious training is broken by the in-
dependent and private choice of recipients. ' ' 104  This theory has
101 Duncan, supra note 77, at 853. Professor Duncan argues that this phobia motivated Jus-
tice Scalia's wariness of an overly protective Free Exercise Clause:
In Smith, the voice whispering in Justice Scalia's ear warned him that a strongly pro-
tective free exercise doctrine would place at risk not only drug laws but also laws dealing
with compulsory military service, payment of taxes, manslaughter, child neglect, compul-
sory vaccination, traffic regulation, minimum wages, child labor, animal cruelty, envi-
ronmental protection, and racial equality. In short, the social contract itself might not
survive a constitutional rule protecting religiously motivated conduct from governmental
restrictions.
Id. at 854 (footnotes omitted).
102 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879),
which sought to avoid letting "every citizen ... become a law unto himself").
103 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1311-12; see Witters v. Wash. Dep't Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
490-91 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), for the
proposition that "state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational assistance to a
class defined without reference to religion do not violate the second part of the Lemon v. Kurtz-
man test, because any aid to religion results from the private choice of individual beneficiaries."
(footnote omitted)); id. at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) ("The aid to religion is the result of petitioner's private choice.").
104 Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1311-12; see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002)
(upholding, under the Establishment Clause, a pilot program in Ohio that provided aid to
private schools, including religious schools); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1,
13-14 (1993) (holding that the Establishment Clause permits a publicly employed sign-
language interpreter to accompany a deaf student to classes at a Catholic high school, pursuant
to the Individuals with Disabilities Act); Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 (holding that Washington could,
consistent with the Establishment Clause, provide rehabilitative aid to Witters even though he
sought to use those funds for religious education); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399-400 (upholding a
tax deduction for parents whose children attended private, mostly sectarian schools, on the
grounds that the benefits were equally available to all parents and that the benefit to religion
resulted from the individual choice of parents).
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withstood the test of time in the Court's Establishment Clause juris-
prudence, and it is readily applicable to free exercise cases. In Estab-
lishment Clause cases, the state is generally not permitted to use tax
dollars to directly support religious education. However, a state may
provide money to the student or parents of students so that the "pri-
vate and individual choice" of an individual breaks the chain between
the state and religion: the Court then views the state as directly bene-
fiting the parent and only indirectly benefiting the school, which may
or may not be religious. That is why, under Witters, Washington
clearly could choose to fund Davey under the Establishment Clause. l°'
But Davey knew the rules and his individual choice disqualified him
from receiving the scholarship-under the Promise Scholarship, it
was Davey's choice whether to receive the scholarship or to pursue a
major in theology.
10 6
Locke v. Davey has been hailed as a "monumental decision" in favor
of principles of separation of church and state.10'7 As monumental as
it may be, however, it is unclear whether the implications of the deci-
sion will in fact be "breathtaking,"'00 and to where the logic of this de-
cision could possibly extend. The dissenting Justices explicitly stated
that the scope of the Court's decision is narrow, but they were clearly
worried about where the majority's logic could lead.09 At issue in this
case was a scholarship that amounted to less than $3,000, but if the
surviving principle of this case is that a state law may discriminate
105 In Witters, the Court found that the Establishment Clause did not preclude the state of
Washington from extending aid under a vocational rehabilitation program to a student attend-
ing a private, Christian college. But the Court specifically refused to announce that because the
Establishment Clause permits Washington to extend such aid, that the Free Exercise Clause re-
quired such funding. Witters, 474 U.S. at 489 ("We decline petitioner's invitation to leapfrog
consideration of those issues by holding that the Free Exercise Clause requires Washington to
extend vocational rehabilitation aid to petitioners regardless of what the State Constitution
commands or further factual development reveals, and we express no opinion on that mat-
ter.").
106 Under the Promise Scholarship Program, Davey himself made every choice. He chose to
apply for the Scholarship; chose to attend Northwest College, an eligible school; and chose to
pursue a major in theology. Davey, therefore, chose to prioritize his "free exercise" of his relig-
ion over receiving the Promise Scholarship.
107 See Hamilton, supra note 30 (describing the principles of the decision as profound).
108 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 51-52, Davey (No. 02-1315) (statement by Justice
Breyer) ("[T]he implications of this case are breathtaking... if your side wins every program,
not just educational programs, but nursing programs, hospital programs, social welfare pro-
grams, contracting programs throughout the governments [would all be subject to the chal-
lenge] that they cannot be purely secular, that they must fund all religions who want to do the
same thing. ...").
109 See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1320 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's holding is limited to training
the clergy, but its logic is readily extendible, and there are plenty of directions to go. What
next?"); id. at 1320-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (worrying that the term "theology," since it is
not defined by statute, could be extended to mean more than "devotional in nature" thus
broadening the scope of the majority's holding).
1176 [Vol. 6:5
CONSTFIUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
against religion on its face, and explicitly exclude religion from vari-
ous funding schemes, then the reach of this decision may indeed be
profound. The Court granted considerable deference to the states to
determine their own funding preferences. The focus of this case was
not simply the Promise Scholarship and the reach of this case could
affect the way Washington, or any other state with a similar constitu-
tional or statutory provision, appropriates money for education. Af-
ter all, the focus of the Court's opinion was the Washington Constitu-
tion, which forbids using public funds to support religious education
in general, not clerical or ministerial education in particular."' States
could interpret this decision to allow them free reign to exclude reli-
gious education from funding in other contexts, including vouchers.
In Davey, the Court drew a clear line: just because a certain fund-
ing decision may be constitutional under the Establishment Clause, it
is not necessarily required by the Free Exercise Clause. Now that the
Supreme Court has reaffirmed that there is room for "play in the
joints" between the two Religion Clauses, states may choose to reas-
sess all of their funding decisions in the interests of separation of
church and state. States may choose to fund various private school
initiatives and explicitly exclude religious training from these appro-
prations. The Supreme Court has firmly declared that at least one
110 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("No public money or property shall be appropriated for or ap-
plied to any religious... instruction.... ").111 Justice Scalia asserts that Washington (and presumably, any other state) could choose to
fund a scholarship or religious education in general without violating the Free Exercise Clause.
He states that:
[Washington] could make the scholarships redeemable only at public universities
(where it sets the curriculum), or only for select courses of study. Either option would
replace a program that facially discriminates against religion with one that just happens
not to subsidize it. The State could also simply abandon the scholarship program alto-
gether.
Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1317 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is seriously doubtful thatJustice Scalia would
rather have Washington abandon its scholarship program just to avoid free exercise concerns;
he admits that abandoning it "would be a dear price to pay for freedom of conscience." Id. It
seems odd as well thatJustice Scalia would seriously contend that he would prefer that Washing-
ton chooses one of the options he provides that "just happen not to subsidize" religious educa-
tion. Justice Scalia suggests that Washington could exclude from the scholarship students who
choose to attend private schools or that Washington could fund just certain courses of study, a
scholarship for art students, for example. But the Promise Scholarship is desirable because it
offers recipients so many choices: public or private, religious or secular, and every choice of
major except one. Justice Scalia notes these advantages in his opinion. Id. at 1319. Presuma-
bly, Washington could offer a form of scholarship that lists every possible course of study from
anthropology to zoology as an available option but that "just happens" to exclude "theology."
That Washington could engage in such an undertaking, however,just so that its program would
"just happen not to subsidize" religion, borders on the absurd. It could be argued that such an
undertaking is "so gerrymandered and devoid of plausible secular purpose," that it evinces an
intent to discriminate against religion since deliberate enumeration of every conceivable major
except theology would be no accident. Id. at 1317. However, since it is facially neutral-it does
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choice to fund education in general but to exclude religious educa-
tion is constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause.
-Carlos S. Montoyd
not mention religion-it should pass muster under Justice Scalia's view of the Free Exercise
Clause if Washington shows that it had a secular purpose.
J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., University of Virginia.
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